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█ Abstract The first section of this paper outlines the major theme, that “mind” is not the label of some-
thing unitary but of a collection of things that can only be revealed by research at three different levels. 
The first level of enquiry is the account of mind that can be gleaned from what is often referred to as our 
folk psychology. Even with its limitations, it is an indispensable part of our social interactions. The second 
section outlines how, with the rise of experimental psychology, our account of human minds has been ex-
tended because experimental psychology often reveals a level of factors in our mental life which is not 
open to ordinary observation. The third section explores how our account of human minds is extended 
even further by the modern instrument-aided researches at the level of neuropsychology. The fourth sec-
tion argues that no one level of enquiry should be described as ultimate or dominant but that each level 
reveals different facts about our mental life. The fifth section sums up and argues that a common narrow 
version of “naturalizing the mind” is a mistaken enterprise. 
KEYWORDS: Mind; Mind/Body Problem; Naturalism/Naturalization; Psychology; Neuropsychology 
 
 
█ Riassunto Alla ricerca della “mente” – La prima parte di questo articolo illustra il tema principale del la-
voro, ossia che “mente” non è l’etichetta linguistica per qualcosa di unitario, ma sta a indicare un insieme 
di cose che può solo essere svelato da una ricerca da condurre su tre differenti livelli. Il primo livello 
d’indagine è la descrizione della mente che può essere desunta da ciò cui solitamente ci si riferisce come la 
nostra psicologia ingenua. Nonostante i suoi limiti questa è una parte imprescindibile delle nostre intera-
zioni sociali. La seconda parte illustra come, con il sorgere della psicologia sperimentale, la nostra de-
scrizione delle menti umane si è estesa, poiché la psicologia sperimentale spesso rivela un livello di fattori 
nella nostra vita mentale che non sono accessibili con l’osservazione ordinaria. La terza parte esplora 
come la nostra descrizione delle menti umane è andata anche oltre grazie all’apparato strumentale di cui i 
ricercatori hanno potuto fruire sul piano della neuropsicologia. Nella quarta parte si sostiene che nessuno 
dei livelli d’indagine può essere descritto come ultimo o dominante, ma ogni livello rivela fatti diversi sulla 
vita della mente. Nella quinta parte si tirano le fila del discorso, sostenendo come una visione ristretta di 
senso comune della “naturalizzazione della mente” sia un’impresa fuorviante. 
PAROLE CHIAVE: Mente; Problema mente/corpo; Naturalismo/naturalizzazione; Psicologia; Neuropsicologia
 
 
 
 
 
 
STUDI  
 
(α)Department of Philosophy, Trinity College, College Green, Dublin 2 - P02 DN 40 - Dublin (Ireland) 
E-mail: wlyons@tcd.ie () 
Creative Commons - Attribuzione - 4.0 Internazionale 
Researching “The Mind”  
 
195 
MY INTEREST IN THIS ESSAY is not with the 
merits or otherwise of individual theories 
about the nature of mind and body and their 
interconnection. My concern is with an as-
sumption, which has been made by almost all 
of the mind-brain theories put forward over 
the last hundred years or so and has shaped 
their theories in a very strong way, but has by 
and large remained unexamined. 
In more detail my concern is that, very 
briefly, all the mainstream accounts from 
mind-body dualism to functionalism and be-
yond seem to presume that the mind or the 
mental is unitary or monolithic in some quite 
fundamental way. Either the mind (or “men-
tality”) was conceived of as a special sort of 
“stuff” or special type of property which mer-
its the label “mind”, or as our dispositions to 
produce a special class of “higher” cognitive 
behaviour, or as nothing but the brain, or as a 
special functional way of talking about brains 
and behaviour, and so on. In general it was 
always a case of looking for some one thing in 
a wide sense of the term “thing”, as it was 
variously used to mean a basic “stuff”, a dis-
tinctive property, a special set of dispositions, 
an amateurish way of referring to the brain, 
the brain itself, or a special sort of functional 
description. One shining exception, of 
course, was Freud who argued that the mind 
operated on three levels – the conscious, the 
sub-conscious and the unconscious. But the 
influence of Freud and psychoanalysis on 
mainstream philosophy of mind, psychology 
and neuroscience has been negligible.1 
The conceptualizing of the human mind as 
unitary all too easily leads to researchers dis-
missing the levels and areas of enquiry that do 
not fit in with their “unitary” view. Thus a 
Cartesian-minded researcher (in, say, Phe-
nomenology or Phenomenological Psycholo-
gy), who believes that the term “mind” is co-
extensive with “consciousness” will dismiss 
anything unconscious as ipso facto non-
mental. Contrariwise “a mind is nothing but 
the brain” researcher will dismiss the world of 
consciousness and qualia as illusory, and a be-
haviourist will dismiss from the purview of 
research into the mind anything that can not 
be captured in terms of contextual input and 
consequent behavioural output, and so on. 
I want to counter-suggest that the proper 
way of explaining human psychology, and in 
that sense give a proper explanation of mind, 
human minds, is to seek explanations at a 
number of different levels which will have 
interconnections of various kinds. But to say 
that is give you the ending before the jour-
neys that lead up to it. 
 
I 
 
Traditionally the first level of explaining 
the mind is by means of our ordinary, cul-
ture-guided folk psychology. This level is es-
sential to our ordinary social cum cultural in-
tercourse, for it enables us to build up some 
model or picture of the “mind” or psychology 
of our friends, acquaintances and any others 
we come in contact with in our daily com-
merce. To have a good model or picture (a 
picture with some explanatory and predictive 
value) of the psychology of, for example, 
your colleagues is to know a great deal about 
their beliefs, hopes, needs, goals and values 
which will enable you to predict in an ap-
proximate way what they are likely to do or 
how they are likely to react on most occa-
sions. In turn this enables you to avoid hurt-
ing or embarrassing them, to commune with 
them in a pleasant manner, to aid them when 
their plans go awry, to soothe them when 
their psyche is bruised, and so on. This ability 
to “look into the mind of another” (or simu-
late or model the mind of another) makes so-
cial life possible or, at least for the most part, 
bearable. A typical folk psychological expla-
nation of some piece of operant or purposive 
behaviour is to say “She did that because she 
believed no one was about and had a strong 
desire to ease the itch on the inner side of her 
nose” or “He insulted Fred because he re-
sented Fred’s continual boasting about own-
ing a FIAT 124 Spider sports car and its ca-
pabilities”. 
But our folk psychological model-making 
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is also very important in respect of ourselves. 
It enables us to carry about a model or pic-
ture of our own person and personality, and 
so to give our life and behaviour some struc-
ture and coherence and, perhaps most im-
portantly, value. We need a good “self-
concept” to be, as the Irish sometimes say, 
“happy in oneself”. When we become inco-
herent about our own mind, when our folk 
psychological view of it becomes fractured or 
hopelessly blurred or lacking in confidence in 
regard to it, our behaviour will disintegrate 
and we will be deemed to be mentally ill. 
There are many causes of mental illness, of 
course, including suffering a severe blow to 
the head or becoming addicted to some drug. 
But this incoherence, at the folk psychologi-
cal level of picturing ourselves mentally, can 
be caused in a myriad of ways. For example, a 
young person may lose confidence in herself 
through bullying or failing to fit in socially 
because of her sexual orientation or because 
of sexual abuse of some sort. She may lose 
sight of any good on the horizon. More gen-
erally one way of sliding towards suicide is to 
view oneself – one’s needs, desires, hopes, 
aims – as hopelessly blighted, frustrated, 
blunted, underappreciated and so without 
value. In folk psychological terms we would 
say that such a person has lost hope and so is 
“in despair”.2 
Our folk psychological accounts of minds 
are also important in the intercourse between 
cultures.3 Many of the allied prisoners of war 
of the Japanese in WWII underwent another 
layer of suffering, besides those due to incar-
ceration and its cruelties and privations, 
when they found themselves unable to com-
prehend the mind of their Japanese captors. 
The prisoners could not predict the actions 
or reactions of the Japanese so that the lat-
ter’s behaviour often burst forth as complete-
ly unpredicted and inherently unpredictable. 
On top of their physical suffering, their puz-
zlement, surprise, astonishment and sheer 
incomprehension reached high levels of cog-
nitive distress. Of course the Japanese en-
countered the same difficulty in reading the 
minds of their captives but then their suffer-
ing was less as they were in charge of the 
tragic (and sometimes comic) proceedings. 
We can be better or worse than others at 
concocting folk psychological models of our-
selves and others, just as we can be better or 
worse at anything that takes time to learn 
and employs abilities in the process. We ad-
mire the detective work of the Miss Marples4 
of this world because we admire their superi-
or grasp of folk psychology. We blunder in 
and say “He couldn’t have killed Elizabeth as 
he loves her”, but Miss Marple gently re-
minds us that we can kill out of love just as 
easily as out of hate, because love can gener-
ate jealousy and fear and anxiety and pain, 
and all these can be motives for and at times 
the precipitating causes of murder. 
The folk psychological level of psycholog-
ical explanation is the most obvious home of 
intentional talk. “Intentional talk” is the 
phenomenon whereby we express – at least 
in English – a belief or a hope or an inten-
tion, or want or need or desire, in terms of a 
subject and verb plus a content describable 
by means of a particular non-substitutable 
description. When we believe something or 
desire something, we do so in terms of an in-
escapably particular and personal viewpoint 
(intentio in Latin) about what it is we believe 
or desire. So, when this intentio is expressed 
verbally, we do so partly in terms of a par-
ticular description of what it is that we be-
lieve or desire. If I believe that the old man 
who lives across the road from me is now 78 
years old, it does not follow that I believe 
that Professore Emerito Giorgio di Luca 
who, during working hours, occupies room 
101 in the basement of the Department of 
Anthropology at the University of Siena, is 
78 years old. I may not know that “the old 
man who lives across the road from me” is 
one and the same person as “Professore 
Emerito Giorgio di Luca who, during work-
ing hours, occupies room 101 in the base-
ment of the Department of Anthropology”. 
So I could sincerely agree that I believe that 
the old man who lives across the road from 
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me is 78 years old, but sincerely deny that I 
have any knowledge or belief about Profes-
sore Emerito Giorgio di Luca. 
The basic source of most of our infor-
mation is perceptual in the broadest sense, 
and perception is inherently aspectual. We 
see or hear something from a particular di-
rection or viewpoint. Likewise a large “pic-
ture”, or picture in a wider not-merely-
perceptual sense, of Professore di Luca, or 
anything else is aspectual. I will know or be-
lieve certain facts or alleged facts about him 
but not others. My “grasp” of him, cognitive-
ly speaking, will be irredeemably aspectual. It 
is salutary to reflect that a computer and a 
radar receiver, at least when described as if 
they were human knowers, are similarly as-
pectual. The Trinity College Dublin comput-
ers will tell you that Martin O’Murchu is a 
member of the staff of Trinity College but it 
will deny (not tell you or not respond posi-
tively when queried) that Martin Murphy 
(the anglicization of that name) is a staff 
member of Trinity College. The radar scan-
ner will tell you that an aeroplane flying at 
the speed of sound is approaching from the 
north but not that the only combat jet plane 
Luxembourg has is approaching from the 
north. 
All knowledge of the universe around 
about us except, the theologians tell us, that 
of God, is aspectual. Our folk psychological 
descriptions of ourselves or others, being in-
tentional descriptions, are aspectual. We de-
scribe or explain the minds of ourselves or 
others through our intentio of ourselves or 
them. We describe both ourselves or others 
from our own point of view, as there is no 
view from nowhere. 
  
II 
 
There is no denying that, even from with-
in its own sphere, our folk psychological 
knowledge of minds is limited and open to 
error. Our everyday folk psychology, so very 
useful, is nevertheless inescapably intentional 
and thereby subjective, aspectual and partial. 
So why should our mind (our psychology) 
only be describable at that one folk psycho-
logical level? Particularly if it is likely that 
folk psychology evolved by humans looking 
at other humans from the outside, watching 
their behaviour, gestures, postures and utter-
ances. What is more this approach to our 
psychology seems to have evolved millennia 
ago but has served us well in its limited scope 
of enabling our ordinary social cum cultural 
intercourse, by enabling us to build up some 
model or picture of the “mind” or psychology 
of our friends, enemies or acquaintances and 
any others we come in contact with in our 
daily commerce. But, to repeat this point, it is 
inherently and admittedly (or should be) lim-
ited in scope and open to error. 
So if we take our folk psychology to be a 
first-level, socially-useful but limited ap-
proach to human psychology or our 
knowledge of minds, what is the next level? 
The next level is experimentally-based psy-
chological descriptions generated by profes-
sional psychologists. Towards the end of the 
19th Century when psychology made its break 
away from philosophy, its early experiments 
were subjective introspective experiments. 
But with the overthrow of Introspectionism 
by Behaviorism, psychological experiments 
became by and large objective behavioral ex-
periments.5 For example, a psychologist, 
masquerading as a market-researcher, might 
ask people in the street to taste the tooth-
paste in eight separate tubes of toothpaste, 
where the tubes have been given plain wrap-
pers, are numbered 1 to 8 and have been 
placed side by side on a display tray. She will 
then ask the people in the street, who come 
towards the tray out of curiosity, to taste the 
paste from each tube and report which paste 
tastes the best. She will find that the great 
majority choose tube number 8 as having the 
best tasting toothpaste. She will then ask 
each subject why they chose the toothpaste 
they chose. The subjects will produce a re-
markable array of explanations, from the ba-
roque, “Number 8 has a deeply satisfying af-
ter-taste like the best mint julep tea”, and the 
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precise “I love its freshness”, to the non-
committal vagueness of “It just has some-
thing the others don’t have”. 
Later the psychologist informs her col-
leagues in a research seminar that it was the 
exact same toothpaste in all the tubes and 
that the majority chose the paste from tube 
number 8 because it was on the right-hand-
side of the tray and, since English, Italian, 
French or German was the mother-tongue of 
most of the subjects, the subjects “read” or 
scanned the tray from left to right. This 
means that the last item on the right-hand-
side of the tray attains, unknown to the ex-
perimental subjects, a privileged position in 
respect of attention and subsequent selec-
tion. She may then label this observed effect 
of position on choice as “the position effect”.6 
“The position effect” is intentional be-
cause it involves perception and attention 
but “the work” so to speak, the causal work, 
is being done via the human habit of people 
in certain cultures reading or scanning always 
from left to right. The habit is now incarnat-
ed in us and does its work in an unobtrusive 
subterranean way. We don’t notice it at 
work. It is also not readily associated with 
our intentional attitudes. However, when the 
subjects were asked for an explanation for 
their choice of paste, they immediately 
launched into an account that involved the 
attitude of “liking” or “loving”. They, like us 
all, operate in everyday life at the level of the 
attitudes of folk psychology. 
Let us consider another explanation of be-
haviour from the point of view of experimental 
psychology. This example has been dubbed 
“the bystander effect”.7 As an experiment, an 
incident is “created” involving a pedestrian in a 
busy street being punched, robbed of a bag and 
then pushed over. Repetitions of this experi-
ment revealed that the likelihood of a passerby 
going to the aid of the victim is roughly in an 
inverse proportion to the number of other peo-
ple visible nearby in the street. The greater the 
number of perceived bystanders, the less the 
likelihood that one of them will go to the aid of 
the street victim. 
The form of these experiments is related 
to the classical structure of psychological be-
haviourism. The aim is to control the envi-
ronmental input and observe what output in 
terms of human behaviour is elicited by it, 
and then to quantify the results and produce 
a statement about the probable “effect” on 
humans in that context. 
Producing such quantifiable results led 
psychologists to realize that, if one could ac-
curately construct and control an environ-
ment, then one could also condition subjects 
via the environment so as to control their be-
haviour. Thus the psychologist might seek to 
cure a person’s addiction to smoking ciga-
rettes by associating images of cigarette 
smoking with images of scarred and cancer-
ous lungs and decaying teeth. Or the psy-
chologist might seek to cure a subject of a 
phobia in connection with cats by placing 
them in a room full of very tranquil and af-
fectionate cats, bringing the subject close to a 
cat and getting him or her to stroke the cat 
explaining that the resulting purring is sign of 
cat happiness. 
The reason why these sorts of psychologi-
cal experiments amount to a second level of 
knowledge and description of our minds, is 
that they very often amount to a correction 
of our folk psychological account of the hu-
man behaviour elicited in that context. That 
we used our folk psychology to explain why 
we chose the toothpaste at the end of the 
line-up or why we didn’t go to help the victim 
lying in the street makes it clear that we are 
giving “mental” descriptions. It makes it clear 
that we see ourselves as talking about minds. 
That the psychologists’ experiments often 
contradict the explanations of folk psycholo-
gy shows that this second experimental level 
of explanation is still in the realm of what we 
consider to be mental. It just gives different 
results or different information which is 
sometimes a correction of the traditional ver-
sion from folk psychology. 
This second-level experimental type of 
psychological explanation is not rejecting our 
ordinary folk psychological explanation so 
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much as now and again putting it in its place. 
Of course person X did believe that the 
toothpaste tasted like mint julep tea and per-
son Y did believe that it had a freshness that 
the other toothpastes did not have. Further-
more the beliefs will likely have led them to 
say what they did say about why they chose 
that toothpaste (at the right-hand end of the 
line of toothpastes) rather than the others. 
Nevertheless the subjects were simply wrong 
about why they chose the toothpaste they 
chose. Their beliefs about the taste of the 
toothpaste did not cause them to choose as 
they did, the position of the toothpaste did. 
Their account in terms of taste was a post fac-
tum folk psychological rationalization. 
Some of the results of such psychological 
experiments should still be described in 
terms of motivation or lack of it, and so 
should still be described in folk psychological 
terms. For example, in regard to “the by-
stander effect”, the experimenter will very 
likely be interested in the bystanders’ own 
explanations as to why he or she did not go to 
the help of the victim. These explanations 
will refer to the bystander being shy or afraid 
or confused or in a panic or some such, 
though even here the experimenter may be 
able to “read” the bystander’s intentional at-
titudes better than the bystander himself or 
herself. For the experimenter is more likely to 
be impartial and objective. 
Another somewhat bizarre example. An 
action might be caused subliminally,8 that is 
to say, through information entering our 
head sub limen mentis consciae or below the 
threshold of consciousness. For example, a 
single frame with a picture of a hat and the 
text “Buy Monsieur Chapeau’s Hats”, might 
be inserted at regular intervals (say in one 
frame in every twenty five) in the long strip 
of plastic which comprises a copy of the film 
La Dolce Vita. Whether or not this would in-
duce a viewer to buy a Monsieur Chapeau 
Hat, or any hat, is unclear. What is not in 
dispute is that the information is received, 
though the viewer does not know that he or 
she received it. His or her brain “reads” the 
message, but he or she does not. Indeed, if 
questioned, he might say that he has never 
heard of the brand of hats called “Monsieur 
Chapeau’s Hats”. What’s more he himself 
doesn't wear a hat, though his friend on his 
left in the cinema does. But it is not too far 
fetched to say that, subliminally, he does 
“house” the belief that there is a brand of hat 
called “Monsieur Chapeau’s Hats” and that, 
if he were a wearer of hats, he would consider 
it to be a good sort of hat for him to buy. 
But there is really no need to delve into 
these bizarre and perhaps controversial ex-
amples. A great deal of the ordinary infor-
mation a person acts on enters his or her 
head subliminally and so is usually unavaila-
ble for us in our folk psychological discourse. 
You are walking along a street, then look up 
and catch someone looking at you from a 
window a few floors up in the building across 
the street. You looked up most likely because 
your peripheral vision received the infor-
mation that the person had moved. You visu-
ally “ingested” the movement without realiz-
ing it. In the same way you sit down quickly 
and successfully on the chair in your office 
that you’ve seen but not looked at. You realize 
the clock has stopped because the familiar un-
attended-to background noise of its ticking 
has ceased. In your car you negotiate a com-
plex route home though all your attention has 
been taken up discussing Frege’s theory of ref-
erence with your front-seat passenger. 
It seems clear enough that experimental 
psychology often corrects our folk psycholog-
ical explanations and often makes us aware 
of the parts of our psychology that remain 
below the surface of our ordinary conscious 
intentional life of hoping, wanting, believing, 
desiring, loving, hating and all the rest. Some-
times these corrections involve very basic 
levels of our mental life such as those to do 
with perception. The marvelous array of clever 
visual illusions associated with the names of 
Muller-Lyer, Necker and Zollner showed all too 
clearly that we can easily be duped by a our 
basic senses, particularly vision.9 
This corrective role for psychology has 
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led the more theoretically-minded psycholo-
gists or philosophers of mind to generate a 
new vocabulary for the mental activities that 
lead to human action. In recent cognitive 
psychology, for example, the causal explana-
tion of why someone said or did something 
might be described in terms of the infor-
mation about the environment just gained, 
plus an account of how it was presumed this 
information was processed in the light of in-
formation already held “in store”. In turn this 
processing might be explained in terms of ed-
iting, interpreting, selecting, and the like. 
This information might then go through a fur-
ther series of processes which are to be de-
scribed as being weighed up or evaluated in the 
light of the subject’s previously stored goals or 
plans or prohibitions. Finally these sub-routines 
might be described as being combined or 
summated to produce something like a “motor-
set” or immediate plan of action. 
These new concepts of cognitive psychol-
ogy and information science are, of course, 
often intentional because they are epistemo-
logically-based concepts. But these inten-
tional concepts often bear little or no resem-
blance to the intentional concepts of our or-
dinary folk psychology. Indeed there has 
been a deliberate effort by much contempo-
rary cognitive psychology to underline its dis-
tance from folk psychology precisely by gen-
erating this new scientific vocabulary that is 
more sophisticated and more exact and less 
subject oriented. This new vocabulary,10 is 
often borrowed from computer programing 
and hardware, and so there are references to 
storage, access, executive monitoring, dis-
criminators, receptors, feedback, control 
loops, scanners, representors, analogues, par-
allel processing, recognition, simulation, and 
heuristic procedures. 
As has already been acknowledged, a 
good number of these terms are nevertheless 
cognitive and so intentional. To monitor, 
discriminate, scan, represent, recognize, or 
engage in a heuristic (or investigative) pro-
cedure is to engage in an intentional activity. 
For to do any of these things involves at some 
stage something like beliefs about the object, 
target or content of the activity of which these 
procedures are the antecedents, and so as-
sumes an aspectual “grasp” of that object, tar-
get or content. But what has been left behind 
are the more subjectively loaded intentional 
concepts of folk psychology such as know, be-
lieve, guess, wish, want, desire, need, hope, 
fear, despair, love, hate and all the other terms 
of our everyday conversations. 
 
III 
 
The third level at which we discover 
things about the nature of our minds might 
be described as the neuropsychological. Giv-
en the nature of much of the research in this 
area, another way of putting it, or a great deal 
of it, might be to call it behavioural neurosci-
ence, for the aim is very often to link neuro-
physiological activity directly to behaviour. 
Because its chief aim is relational in that way, 
it differs from pure neuroscience where the 
aim is the self-contained study of the brain’s 
neurophysiology. 
Neuropsychological explanations might 
seek to explain such matters as how the brain 
processes perceptual input, and integrates it 
with previously stored input, in order to di-
rect subsequent human behaviour. While 
particular research projects may encompass 
only very small facets of these broad stages, 
the ultimate aim always, presumably, is to 
provide the “brain segments or stages” for 
the fullest possible explanations of human 
behaviour, including that behaviour we think 
of as “higher” or “cognitive” and so “mental”. 
To take once again a simplified example. 
One might describe John’s ears as having re-
ceived certain sound waves, which, via the 
internal workings of his ear, and the auditory 
nerve, were converted into electrochemical 
signals. In turn these signals reached the au-
ditory cortex and Wernicke’s area in his left-
temporal lobe and then, via the associative 
cortex, and the limbic region, reached Broca’s 
area or the motor language centre in the infe-
rior frontal gyrus of the left cerebral hemi-
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sphere. John then moved the muscles associat-
ed with speech production and produced 
sound waves at an audible level of “so and so” 
decibels, and at the same time he appeared to 
be in a physiologically excited state. In a shorter 
folk psychological account, John is said to have 
replied angrily to an offensive remark. 
The contrast in length and detail, and ac-
cessibility, between the neuropsychological 
explanation and the folk psychological one, 
makes it clear once again that the former 
could never replace the latter. But that is not 
the point of those who do research at this 
third neuropsychological level. For their 
point is that certain aspects of our mental life 
can only be revealed fully at this level. If one 
is to understand, and then cure, chronic ag-
gressive irascibility, the explanation will most 
likely come about via the neuropsychology of 
anger. For the very fact that we have labelled 
it as “chronic”, implies that we have failed to 
bring about any real understanding and so 
any hope of a cure at the “talking him or her 
out of it” or folk psychological level. Similarly 
amnesia, aphasia and various forms of the 
retardation or erosion of mental faculties and 
abilities will be, very often, the result of neu-
rophysiological damage or malfunction, per-
haps genetic or in the womb or at birth. 
Though there is less agreement in this area, 
mental illnesses such as chronic depression 
and paranoia, various forms of addiction and 
obsession, may eventually be best explained 
and alleviated at the neuropsychological level. 
However it might be argued here that 
neuropsychological accounts are not really 
psychological at all, and so not about minds 
or psyche. They are just about our physiology 
and could be described in the electrochemical 
neurological vocabulary of pure neurophysi-
ology. Consequently, it might be argued, the 
full neuropsychological accounts need not 
make any mention of human cognitive and 
appetitive functions. 
But that argument is unconvincing. Our 
neurophysiology is not a world unto itself. It 
is the engine room of the whole human or-
ganism. Its activities only make sense when 
connected with humans at the macro social 
or “ordinary living” level. To say otherwise 
would be like saying that the only real expla-
nation for why the car turned left would be to 
mention just the electronics and mechanics 
of the car that turned left, without mention-
ing the driver and his desire to go somewhere 
and then his bodily movements at the macro 
level of foot and arm movements. To get 
back to humans and their behaviour, even in 
cases such as aphasia, say after a stroke, ulti-
mately what we are seeking to explain is 
Fred’s or Mary’s sudden inability to form 
spoken sentences in a comprehensible man-
ner or to understand what is said to him or 
her. We are seeking an explanation as to why 
their mind has suddenly been impaired in a 
drastic way, a way that makes their social life 
minimal or, in some cases, impossible. We 
have been given a deep-source causal explana-
tion of what, at our folk psychology level, pre-
sented itself as an alarming and pitiable inabil-
ity any longer to converse. For conversing is a 
very sophisticated cognitive ability, a very so-
phisticated part of our mental abilities, and we 
are the only animals capable of it.11 
Academic psychology has edged ever 
closer to the brain sciences and now invaria-
bly has units or sub-departments of neuro-
psychology. As we have seen one sort of neu-
ropsychologist is in effect often a behavioural 
neuroscientist and is interested in the causes 
of behaviour at the level of brain processing. 
So it will be no surprise that of particular in-
terest and pressing importance to some neu-
ropsychologists will be the search for the 
causes and cures of the behaviour we associ-
ate with mental illness. The first category of 
such mental illnesses would be the fairly ob-
viously chronic ones such as amnesia (loss of 
memory) and dementia (a more or less com-
plete loss of cognitive abilities, with Alz-
heimer’s Disease being the most common 
version). The second category will be mental 
illnesses where the basic cognitive abilities 
are by and large not impaired but where the 
behaviour in question is “socially eccentric” 
and so makes living a normal social life very 
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difficult. Another way of putting this is to say 
that the patient’s grasp and use of ordinary 
folk psychology, or at least some areas of it, 
has become tenuous. This second category in-
cludes such mental illnesses as bipolar disorder 
(with its manic-depressive behaviour), psycho-
sis and schizophrenia (with their delusional 
thinking and behaviour), paranoia (with its 
persecution-complex behaviour), and psychop-
athy (with its subject’s stark egocentricity and 
consequent lack of the emotional spectrum of 
sympathy, compassion, guilt and remorse). In 
the light of the lack of conspicuous success in 
the cure of mental illnesses at the other two lev-
els, medicine now most frequently looks to the 
experimentally-minded neuropsychologist for 
future cures. 
The first category of mental illnesses is of-
ten described as “organic”, that is to say, as 
associated with a breakdown at the organic 
level, where the organ in question is almost 
always the brain. Amnesia is a failure in ei-
ther the ability to lay down memory traces 
and networks or else to retrieve information 
from them. Thus damage to the medial tem-
poral lobe might be discovered to be the 
cause of chronic amnesia or else damage to 
the hippocampus and thalamus.12 Atrophy of 
or damage to the anterior temporal lobe 
might be discovered to be the cause of severe 
semantic dementia.13 In the light of these 
findings the neuropsychologist may well argue 
that the best procedure is to try and stop fur-
ther degradation of these areas or else hope 
that, in the future, the introduction of stem 
cells or something equally neurophysiological-
ly basic might even reverse the damage. Fu-
ture research is likely to focus on the latter. 
But neuropsychological research is not 
just about organic mental illness and how to 
treat it. It is the newest pathway into our un-
derstanding of the human mind in general. 
To take just one further example, psycholo-
gists, long before the rise of modern brain 
scanners, were fascinated by the nature of 
emotions and knew that the brain and other 
parts of the body had a major role to play in 
it.14 But there is no denying that the modern 
techniques for gaining information about 
brain functioning have improved our 
knowledge of the brain’s part in our emo-
tions. While for a long time it was suspected, 
or at least hoped that, in the manner of a 
modern revision of phrenology, distinct emo-
tions were to be associated with distinct and 
discrete areas of the brain, this proved to be 
incorrect. Rather «a set of interacting brain 
regions commonly involved in basic psycho-
logical operations of both an emotional and 
non-emotional nature are active during emo-
tional experience and perception across a 
range of discrete emotion categories».15 The 
same brain areas and their physiological or 
“bodily motions” consequences in pulse rate, 
respiration rate, sweating, gastro-intestinal 
motility and the like may be common to 
more than one emotion. So one cannot dis-
tinguish emotions, at least to the extent that 
we do with our rich folk psychological vo-
cabulary, at the neurophysiological level. 
This in turn favours a cognitive account of 
emotion whereby it is argued that we should 
distinguish our ordinary folk psychological 
emotion types, such as anger and fear, on the 
basis of the subject’s folk psychological view 
of the world around about her or him at that 
precise period of time. Thus the physiologi-
cal upset will be assigned the label “fear”, if 
the subject views the context as dangerous or 
threatening in some respect to herself or 
someone close to her, but the label “anger” if 
the subject views the situation as insulting or 
demeaning or irritating or something from 
that range of annoyance to herself or some-
one or something, such as a cause or ideology 
or religion, close to her. Emotions tell us 
about how we view the world, even if our 
view is mistaken. They are not reliable ac-
counts of how the world is, but only reliable 
accounts of how we think the world is. In-
deed our emotions can contradict what we 
say. The murderer can say he is sorry for kill-
ing the child when clearly, emotionally, the 
judge and jury can see he is not.16 
But in looking at neuropsychology “in 
general”, we also see its limitations. In our 
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example above in regard to neuropsychologi-
cal research into the emotions, we learnt that 
the generic term “emotion” and the labels for 
particular emotions such as “love”, “hate”, 
“fear”, “anger”, “grief”, “anxiety”, “joy”, “ex-
citement”, and the rest, are folk psychological 
terms. The neuropsychology of emotions is 
irrevocably stuck with these terms because 
they represent the emotive states of mind 
which are so central to our ordinary “macro” 
lives as humans. Any explanation solely at the 
micro level of neuronal networks and their 
synaptic connections and neurotransmitters 
will not tell us about human emotions, about 
the emotions of those sophisticated social an-
imals called “humans”. They will only tell us 
in ever increasing sophistication about the 
neuronal underpinning of human emotions. 
In fact we also need the strictures of regular 
experimental psychology for us to fully un-
derstand our emotional life. For example, 
regular experimental psychology can inform 
us about the deviant emotions or the lack of 
certain “other regarding” emotions in the 
lives of psychopaths17 or about how certain 
environments involving music, odours and 
lighting can affect our emotions and so effect 
how much we might buy in a store.18 Or it 
can help us sort out the difference between 
emotions at the death of our mother and 
emotions when watching a film about the 
heart-rending death of a mother.19 
 
IV 
 
So where are we now in regard to our 
knowledge of mind? The full spectrum of ex-
planations at each of these levels – the folk 
psychological, the experimental psychologi-
cal, and the neuropsychological – produce a 
genuinely panoramic and informative and 
useful account of the sources of human ac-
tion. The aims in regard to research at each 
level are quite different, and so the results are 
inevitably different. For the most part they 
do not compete with one another, such that 
one account is not better without qualifica-
tion than another. In certain contexts one 
level of explanation will obviously be pre-
ferred and so better for that context. But 
generally speaking we should say that the dif-
ferent levels produce different sorts of expla-
nations for aspects of the same explanandum. 
But because there are different levels and 
different types of explanation in regard to 
mind, it does not follow that the term “mind” 
is irretrievably ambiguous. Rather the upshot 
is that mind should be considered to be the 
core of human psychology which can only be 
captured by explanations and descriptions at 
several levels. So we should give up any hunt 
for a mind. Mind is not unitary in the sense 
that it is a single stuff or a unique property or 
a special type of discourse or a single any-
thing else. It is unitary only in the sense that 
at each level of explanation, or for each type 
of explanation, there is a common “target ar-
ea”, human psychology, and some common 
aspects of that “target area”. The terms “in-
ternal sources”, “environment” and “behav-
ior” occur unambiguously at each explanato-
ry level. So that the “target area” could also 
be described as “the internal sources of the 
operant behaviour of humans occurring in 
given environments”. This “target area” is 
what traditionally, in our folk psychology, 
bears the label “mind” and so, thinking that 
the word “mind” operates linguistically like 
the word “body”, we have searched for a uni-
tary ontological thing as reference for the 
word “mind”. 
 
V 
 
One very important thing that emerges 
from all the above discussions is that it is our 
folk psychology that still outlines most of 
what we think of as mind or our mental life 
and so still outlines in a rough and ready way 
psychological research at all the different lev-
els. It was, one can say, in our folk psycholo-
gy that we mapped out the “target area”. So 
in turn it is most often at least partly in terms 
of the vocabulary of folk psychology that 
psychologists ordinarily report about their 
research and neuropsychologists, at least in 
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part, seek grants from research-funding 
sources. The curiosity and consequent en-
quiries of our folk psychology have set the 
research agenda long ago, long before the 
other two methods of enquiry even existed, 
and most likely folk psychology will play a 
part in enquiries into mind in the future, if in 
less dominant fashion. For “mind” is not a 
natural kind term like “rabbit” or “body” or 
“gold”, and so it is not something whose def-
inition is to be decided on by some specialist 
science.20 It is an ordinary language umbrella 
term under which we gather all the aspects of 
our mental life that our ancestors have re-
ferred to over the millennia of their daily use 
of our folk psychology and which they think 
of as causing or at least influencing our be-
havior. Those items for which we provide 
shelter under the umbrella term “mind”, can 
be added to over time. It was not so long ago 
that “ordinary folk” began to talk about “be-
ing in denial” or about “the unconscious” or 
“drives” or “syndromes” or “obsessions” and 
much else. In that sense “mind” is an admit-
tedly labile and sometimes vague term yet, it 
seems, nonetheless useful for that. It just 
means that we are finding more things in our 
“target area” as we scrutinize it more closely 
and more carefully.  
In recent decades in philosophy of mind 
there has been a movement to “naturalize the 
mind” by which phrase is meant, in one ver-
sion at least, that we should try and couch 
our explanations of the nature of mind only 
in terms of the natural sciences and the more 
fundamental the natural science the better.21 
I have been arguing against that view. I do so 
because I have tried to demonstrate that 
“mind” is not the label of a “natural kind”, 
like the labels “rabbit” and “body” and 
“gold”, where a “natural kind” is neatly cir-
cumscribed or at times defined by the identi-
fying rules of some particular natural science 
like biology or physics. If you crave for a 
“kind” in relation to “mind”, then the best 
one can do is to call it, say, an “explanatory 
kind”, where the term is defined by the “us-
age” that is forced upon us by the research 
findings about mind in philosophy, psychol-
ogy and the brain sciences. If the result is not 
and cannot ever be something neat and tidy 
like “gold is a yellow malleable ductile ele-
ment with the atomic number 79”, then so be 
it. The result is, I have been arguing, that the 
answer to the question “What is mind?” can 
only be discovered by engaging in psycholog-
ical research at, at least, three different levels 
and with three different types of enquiry.22 
What is more these researches are ongoing 
and probably always will be. That’s how it is. 
The idea of “a mind” as an ontologically 
individual identifiable “thing” has been foist-
ed on us historically mainly via Descartes 
who was influenced heavily by his predeces-
sors, the medieval theologians of “the soul”. 
I’m arguing for the view that what was isolat-
ed by Descartes and his forebears as being 
the nature of a soul (as distinct from a body) 
– for the most part our human cognitive, ap-
petitive and affective powers – must now be 
approached in research projects conducted at 
categorically different ontological levels (at 
the levels of social discourse, of observable 
behaviour and of brain processing) and in con-
sequence using different research methods. 
The upshot is that there’s not, unfortu-
nately, a one simple “thing” that merits the 
label “mind” or “psyche” or “soul”. I say “un-
fortunately” because, if it were otherwise, 
then researching the nature of minds would 
be comparatively straightforward, like study-
ing rabbits or mushrooms. Language is partly 
to blame in all this. It is all too easy to think 
of the word “mind” as a simple labelling term 
(and so a referring-to-some-thing term) like 
“body”, because grammatically (in English at 
any rate) we often use them both in similar 
fashion as subjects or objects of actions and 
events. But to go deeply into that is really the 
topic of another essay. 
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declares in his introduction that Freud as founder 
of psychoanalysis was «one of the defining fig-
ures of twentieth-century culture» (see C. STEN-
GER, Freud’s Legacy in the Global Era, Routledge, 
New York 2016). However he also states in the 
same place that «psychoanalysis today is a rela-
tively insular movement» and that nowadays 
«introductory courses in psychology mention 
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inheritance in evolution, alongside Darwin, Freud 
was one of the first psycho-biologists. See, for ex-
ample, F.K. SULLOWAY, Freud, Biologist of the 
Mind: Beyond The Psychoanalytic Legend, Har-
vard University Press, Cambridge (MA) 1979, II 
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who suffer distress through the dissociation of 
“hearing voices” in their head. There are a num-
ber of theories about why this occurs and how it 
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that one should try to come to terms with the 
“voices” by associating them with some traumatic 
 
 
event in the subject’s earlier life. For it is likely 
that these voices are our own voice trying to come 
to terms with some traumatic event by “telling a 
story about it”. Thereby what was dissociated be-
comes associated. See C. FERNYHOUGH, The Voic-
es Within, Profile Books, London 2016. Neurosci-
entists refer to “the default mode network 
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time – daydreaming, making sense of the past, 
planning for the future. This is the prime time for 
the cultivation of our “self concept”. It is notably 
absent or diminished in people with Autism or 
Alzheimer’s disorders. See A. HORN, D. OST-
WALD, M. REISERT, F. BLANKENBURG, The Struc-
tural-functional Connectome and the Default Mode 
Network of the Human Brain, in: «Neuroimage», 
vol. CII, 2013, pp. 142-151; R.L. BUCKNER, J.R. 
ANDREWS-HANNA, D.L. SCHACTER, The Brain’s 
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pp. 1-38. 
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«Current Directions in Psychological Science», 
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